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California’s Response to the Trumpian Rollback of Wetland
Protections Under the Clean Water Act
Clark Morrison
Introduction
On February 28, 2017, President Donald Trump signed one of his first
executive orders rolling back federal environmental protections for clean air
and water.1 This order, Presidential Executive Order on Restoring the Rule
of Law, Federalism and Growth by Reviewing the “Waters of the United
States Rule” (Trump Executive Order), directed the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers (Corps) and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to initiate
the withdrawal of an Obama-era regulation that defined the scope of federal
jurisdiction over wetlands and other “waters of the United States”
(collectively, “WOTUS”).2
That the President signed this executive order was not surprising. His
newly appointed EPA Administrator, Scott Pruitt, had made it his job as
Oklahoma Attorney General to use litigation to rein in what he perceived as
regulatory excesses of the EPA. In fact, in that capacity, Mr. Pruitt had
already initiated litigation against the very rule that the Trump Executive
Order now seeks to withdraw.3
But the executive order did not stop there. Trump further directed the
Corps and EPA to initiate a rulemaking to pare back the pre-Obama
definition of WOTUS, updated and adopted by the Reagan administration
some thirty years ago.4 The Executive Order explicitly endorses a very
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1. 82 Fed. Reg. 12497-8 (2017) (Waters of the United States Rule).
2. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (1971) (which itself originated in the Federal
Water Quality Control Act Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 816).
3. See Murray Energy Corp., et al. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, et al., 817 F.3d
261 (6th Cir. 2016).
4. “Sec. 3. Definition of ‘Navigable Waters’ in Future Rulemaking. In
connection with the proposed rule described in section 2(a) of this order,
the Administrator and the assistant secretary shall consider interpreting the
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narrow WOTUS definition promoted by the late Justice Antonin Scalia in his
non-controlling plurality opinion in Rapanos v United States.5 On July 27, the
administration published a proposed rule “to initiate the first step in a
comprehensive, two-step process intended to review and revise the
definition of [WOTUS]” consistent with the President’s executive order.6 The
rule is, quite literally, a proposal to “repeal and replace” President Barack
Obama’s WOTUS Rule.
It is hard to overstate the significance of this action. If adopted, the
President’s repeal and replace will eliminate federal protection for millions
of acres of wetlands around the country, including the significant vernal pool
wetland complexes that characterize California’s rural landscape. Under the
current proposal, federal jurisdiction would be limited to only truly
navigable waters and immediately adjacent wetlands with a demonstrable
surface flow connection to navigable waters.
The State of California has reacted swiftly. Early next year, the State
Water Resources Control Board (State Water Board) is expected to adopt
and refer to the Office of Administrative Law its own comprehensive
program for the protection of wetlands and other “waters of the State.”7 This
new program—the State Wetland Definition and Procedures for Discharges
of Dredged or Fill Materials to Waters of the State (the Dredge and Fill
Procedures or the Procedures)—has been in the works for many years. But
the Trump Administration’s actions have given a renewed sense of urgency
to this effort and parried long-standing arguments that the State’s program
would be duplicative of and in conflict with the federal program.
Originally intended to address the limited regulatory gap left by the
Supreme Court’s decision in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers8 (SWANCC), as described below, the Dredge and Fill
Procedures are now being crafted to fill the considerable regulatory void to
be created by the President’s retreat. In fact, the State’s program will go
much further than existing Federal regulations and, arguably, even further
than the expansive Obama-era WOTUS definition that is now in its deaththroes.

term navigable waters, as defined in 33 U.S.C. 1362(7), in a manner
consistent with the opinion of Justice Antonin Scalia in Rapanos v. United
States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).” Waters of the United States Rule, supra note 1.
5. Rapanos v. U.S., 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
6. 82 Fed. Reg. 34889 (2017) (Definition of “Waters of the United
States” Proposed Rule).
7. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., CLEAN WATER ACT SECTION 401 –
CERTIFICATION AND WETLANDS (2017), https://perma.cc/HLS8-EAM6.
8. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S.
159 (2001).
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These dramatic developments follow a long series of decisions in
which the U.S. Supreme Court struggled to address the appropriate scope of
federal jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act. This article will describe that
judicial history, the evolution of the federal wetlands regulatory program in
response to the Court’s decisions (including the Trump administration’s
current effort to pare back federal jurisdiction), and the State of California’s
ambitious program to fill the “Trump Gap” with its own protections for
wetlands and other waters of the State.

Early History of the 404 Program
Since the passage of the Clean Water Act, the courts have been called
on many times to determine the appropriate scope of federal jurisdiction
over waters covered by that statute. Most of these cases have arisen in the
context of Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, which prohibits the
unpermitted discharge of dredged or fill material into covered wetlands and
other types of waters.9 The recurring issue in these cases is the extent to
which a water must be “navigable” to be governed by Section 404.
This question about navigability is present in the very language of the
statute. Although the statute prohibits discharges into “navigable waters,” it
defines this term without any reference to navigability whatsoever. That is,
the Clean Water Act defines the term “navigable waters” to mean “the waters
of the United States, including the territorial seas.”10 So, at its most basic
level, the vexing question is whether a “navigable water” must be “navigable”
at all.
Although the Corps initially viewed its jurisdiction as extending only to
waters that were navigable-in-fact, in 1975 the Corps issued regulations
redefining WOTUS to include not just navigable waters, but also tributaries,
interstate waters and their tributaries, and non-navigable intrastate waters
whose use or misuse could affect interstate commerce.11 These regulations
also covered “freshwater wetlands” that were “adjacent” to other waters
(without any specific requirement that those wetlands be navigable or have
some connection to interstate commerce).12
As presently written—since the Obama administration’s WOTUS
definition has been stayed by the courts—the Corps’s jurisdiction under
Section 404 covers (with certain exceptions) the following bodies of water:

9. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1971).
10. 33 U.S.C. § 1352(7) (1971); 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (1986) (Army Corps
Regulation Defining Waters of the U.S.).
11. 40 Fed. Reg. 31320 (1975) (Army Corps Regulation Defining Waters
of the U.S.).
12. Id.
131
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(1) All waters which are currently used, or were used in the past, or may
be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all waters
which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide;
(2) All interstate waters including interstate wetlands;
(3) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including
intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie
potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation
or destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign commerce including
any such waters:
(i) Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign travelers for
recreational or other purposes; or
(ii) From which fish or shellfish are or could be taken and sold in interstate
or foreign commerce; or
(iii) Which are used or could be used for industrial purpose by industries in
interstate commerce;
(4) All impoundments of waters otherwise defined as waters of the United
States under the definition;
(5) Tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs (a) (1)— (4) of this
section:
(6) The territorial seas;
(7) Wetlands adjacent to waters (other than waters that are themselves
wetlands) identified in paragraphs (a) (1)— (6) of this section.13
The first major case to test the validity of these regulations was United
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,14 in which the Supreme Court considered
whether the Corps’s assertion of jurisdiction over “adjacent wetlands”15 was
valid under the Clean Water Act. In this case, the Sixth Circuit16 held that the
wetlands in question were not “adjacent” because they were not subject to
actual flooding by nearby navigable waters. That is, the court was looking
for some hydrologic connection sufficient to support jurisdiction. The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that it was not unreasonable for the Corps

13. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (1986) (Army Corps Regulation Defining Waters of
the U.S.).
14. U.S. v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
15. The term “wetlands” is defined in the Corps’s regulations to mean
“those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a
frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal
circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for
life in saturated soil conditions. Wetlands generally include swamps,
marshes, bogs and similar areas.” Army Corps Regulation Defining Waters of
the U.S., 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (1986).
16. U.S. v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 729 F.2d 391 (6th Cir. 1984)
132
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to find that, as a general matter, adjacent wetlands are sufficiently “bound
up” with nearby navigable waters to justify the assertion of jurisdiction
without any fact-specific showing of that connection.17
In its analysis, the Court specifically considered the extent to which a
water must actually be navigable to be subject to the Clean Water Act.18
Citing a Senate report, the Court stated that “[a]lthough the Act prohibits
discharges into ‘navigable waters,’ . . . the Act’s definition of ‘navigable
waters’ as ‘waters of the United States makes it clear that the term ‘navigable’ as
used in the Act is of limited import.”19
Riverside Bayview Homes was followed several years later by the Supreme
Court’s decision in SWANCC.20 SWANCC involved a non-navigable waterfilled mining pit that was isolated from (and not adjacent to) any other body
of water.21 In asserting jurisdiction, the Corps relied on 33 C.F.R. §
328.3(a)(3), which covers “[a]ll other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers,
streams . . ., mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet
meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation, or destruction
of which could affect interstate commerce.” The Corps had asserted a
Commerce Clause connection over the SWANCC mining based upon its
“Migratory Bird Rule,” which posited that a Commerce Clause connection
exists for any non-navigable isolated water “which are or would be used
by . . . migratory birds that cross state lines.”22
Given the attenuated Commerce Clause connection asserted by the
Migratory Bird Rule, it was an easy target. In striking down the rule, the
Court—in an opinion authored by Justice Rehnquist—struggled again with
the import of the term “navigability” in the Clean Water Act. Distinguishing
Riverside Bayview Homes, the Court reasoned:
We cannot agree that Congress’s separate definitional use of
the phrase “waters of the United States” constitutes a basis for
reading the term “navigable waters” out of the statute. We said
in Riverside Bayview Homes that the word ‘navigable” in the
statute was of “limited import” . . . . But it is one thing to give

17. Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 134.
18. Id. at 133.
19. Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 133. (internal citations omitted,
emphasis supplied).
20. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S.
159 (2001).
21. Id. at 163.
22. 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,217 (Preamble) (1986) (Proposed Rule
Increasing Clarity on the Waters of the U.S.).
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a word limited effect and quite another to give it no effect
whatever.23

California’s Response to SWANNC
SWANCC generated regulatory tremors in California.
Prior to
SWANCC, the Water Board and its nine Regional Water Quality Control
Boards (the “Regional Water Boards”) generally followed the federal
definition of WOTUS when exercising their authority to “certify” proposed
Corps permits under Section 401 of the Clean Water Act. When the Corps
backed away from asserting jurisdiction over non-navigable isolated waters
as a result of SWANCC, the Water Boards lost their ability to exercise their
oversight (at least under Section 401) with respect to those waters.
To fill this gap, the Water Board’s Office of Chief Counsel issued
guidance advising the Regional Water Boards to assert jurisdiction over
isolated non-navigable waters through the Porter-Cologne Water Quality
Control Act.24 As stated in this guidance, “[g]iven the State [of California]
and federal ‘no net loss’ of wetlands policy, the [Regional Water Boards]
should consider regulating any discharges of waste to waters that may no
longer subject to [Corps] jurisdiction . . .”25 Ever since, the Regional Water
Boards have asserted their own jurisdiction in these instances by requiring
the issuance of “waste discharge requirements” (i.e., permits under PorterCologne) for isolated non-navigable waters disclaimed by the Corps under
SWANCC.
Despite its exclusive reliance on Clean Water Act section 401 to
regulate wetland fills prior to SWANNC, the State of California had already
initiated its own wetlands initiative in 1993.26 In Executive Order W-59-93,
Governor Wilson declared it to be the State’s policy “[t]o ensure no overall
net loss and long-term net gain in the quantity, quality, and permanence of
wetlands acreage and values in California in a manner that fosters creativity,
stewardship, and respect for private property.”27
Governor Wilson’s executive order included a number of subordinate
policies and programs, including a proposal for a “pilot” delegation of Clean
Water Act permitting authority in the San Francisco Bay Area to the San

23. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty, 531 U.S. at 172.
24. Water Board Office of Chief Counsel, EFFECT OF SWANCC V. UNITED
STATES ON THE 401 CERTIFICATION PROGRAM, p. 5 (January 25, 2001); California
Porter-Cologne Act of 1969, Cal. Water Code § 13000 et seq. (2017).
25. Id. at 5.
26. California Wetlands Policy, Executive Order W-59-93 (August 23,
1993).
27. Id. at Section II(1).
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Francisco Regional Water Board and the Bay Conservation and Development
Commission.28 The executive order stated that this pilot project would be
“part of a longer term effort to explore feasibility of Statewide delegation,
with adequate funding, of the program.”29
The delegation program never happened (and one wonders why it is
not being considered today). Nonetheless, since Governor Pete Wilson
established the foundation for a California-based wetlands program, some
of the Regional Water Boards began to develop their own practices for the
protection of wetlands. They did this partly through policies added to their
basin plans, but mostly through certification conditions imposed on
development projects on an ad hoc basis.30 When SWANCC signaled a
limited federal retreat from the Clean Water Act, however, the Water Board
initiated the establishment of a comprehensive State regulatory program for
wetlands and other “waters of the State.”31
Over the last few years, and with much interaction with environmental,
business and other stakeholders, the State Water Board began to issue
public drafts of such a policy. The most recent draft—the “Dredge and Fill
Policy” described above—was published in July of this year.32 The originally
stated objective of what has become the Dredge and Fill Policy was to “fill
the gap” left by the Supreme Court’s decision in SWANCC.33 As noted above,
however, the Water Board is now going much further than that in light of the
Trump administration’s recent actions.

Rapanos and the Obama WOTUS Rule
The Water Board’s current effort was catalyzed by regulatory
developments following the Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in Rapanos. In
this case, the Supreme Court again struggled with the question of how much
connection a non-navigable water must have to a navigable water to

28. Id.
29. Executive Order W-59-93 (August 23, 1993) https://perma.cc/472AZ28X.
30. See LOS ANGELES REGIONAL WATER QUALITY CONTROL BOARD, BASIN PLAN
FOR THE COASTAL WATERSHEDS OF LOS ANGELES AND VENTURA COUNTIES, Chapter
5—Plans and Policies (Sept. 11, 2014).
31. See Clear Water Act § 401, 33 U.S.C. 1341, supra note 7.
32. WATER BOARD, STATE WETLAND DEFINITION AND PROCEDURES FOR
DISCHARGES OF DREDGED OR FILL MATERIALS TO WATERS OF THE STATE (July 21,
2017) (“2017 Dredge and Fill Procedures Final Draft”).
33. EFFECT OF SWANCC V. UNITED STATES ON THE 401 CERTIFICATION
PROGRAM, supra note 24.
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establish jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act.34 The case involved
separate questions of jurisdiction over non-navigable wetlands (such as the
adjacent wetlands considered in Riverside Bayview Homes) and non-navigable
tributaries of traditional navigable waters (i.e., the extent to which federal
jurisdiction creeps up to the headwaters of a navigable river), respectively.35
The Court found it difficult to reach agreement on these issues; the
justices issued five separate opinions. To make things overly simple,
although no single opinion won a majority of the Court, Justice Robert
Kennedy’s opinion (which offered a generous theory of jurisdiction)
generally is recognized as controlling.36 Justice Scalia, in his own plurality
opinion, offered a significant counter-weight (and a far more restricted
theory of jurisdiction) to the views of Justice Kennedy.37
From a lawyer’s perspective, the interaction of the justices in this case
is fascinating. Characteristically, Justice Kennedy offered a somewhat
malleable view of navigability. Citing language from earlier decisions that
focused on the nexus between navigable and non-navigable waters as the
basis for limited extensions of jurisdiction (e.g., Riverside Bayview Homes),
Justice Kennedy expressed the general view that non-navigable waters may
be subject to jurisdiction whenever they bear a “significant nexus” to other,
navigable waters:
When the Corps seeks to regulate wetlands adjacent to
navigable-in-fact waters, it may rely on adjacency to establish
its jurisdiction. Absent more specific regulations, however, the
Corps must establish a significant nexus on a case-by-case
basis when it seeks to regulate wetlands based on adjacency to
nonnavigable tributaries . . . [I]n most cases regulation of
wetlands that are adjacent to tributaries and possess a
significant nexus with navigable waters will raise no serious
constitutional or federalism difficulty. . .and as exemplified by
SWANCC, the significant-nexus test itself prevents some
problematic applications of the statute.38
Justice Kennedy offered no clear rule, however, for determining when
such a nexus might exist.
Not surprisingly, Justice Scalia offered a more restrictive view of federal
jurisdiction. Rather than the vague “significant nexus” theory offered by

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
136
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Justice Kennedy, Justice Scalia focused on the relative permanence of water in a
given location.
In sum, in its only plausible interpretation, the phrase
‘waters of the United States’ includes only those relatively
permanent, standing or continuously flowing bodies of water
‘forming geographic features’ that are described in ordinary
parlance as ‘streams , . . oceans, rivers and lakes. (citation
omitted). The phrase does not include channels through
which waters flows intermittently or ephemerally, or channels
that periodically provide drainage for rainfall . . . . Therefore,
only those wetlands with a continuous surface connection to
bodies that are ‘waters of the United States’ in their own right,
so that there is no clear demarcation between ‘waters’ and
wetlands, are ‘adjacent to’ such waters and covered by the
Act.39
Thus, for linear features, Justice Scalia insisted on a “relatively
permanent” flow to establish jurisdiction.40 For nonlinear features such as
wetlands, Justice Scalia insisted on a continuous surface water connection
between the feature and some traditionally navigable water.41 In short,
Justice Scalia rejected the flexible notions of navigability expressed by
Justice Kennedy, as well the Court’s decision in Riverside Bayview Homes and
even, to some extent, SWANCC. It would require a fairly dramatic rewrite if
one were to incorporate Justice Scalia’s views into the list of WOTUS now
contained in 33 C.F.R. § 328.3.
On December 2, 2008—following the Presidential election but prior to
the inauguration of President Obama—the Corps and EPA issued joint
guidance entitled “Clean Water Act Jurisdiction Following the U.S. Supreme
Court’s Decision in Rapanos v. United States & Carabell v. United States” (“Rapanos
Guidance”).42 The Rapanos Guidance, somewhat heroically, endeavored to
formulate a policy that would reconcile the almost impossibly conflicting
jurisdictional theories of Justices Kennedy and Scalia.
As set forth below, the result was a marvelous regulatory pretzel:

39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 739, 742 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 739.
Rapanos, supra note 5, at 742.
U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS AND U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, CLEAN WATER ACT JURISDICTION FOLLOWING THE U.S. SUPREME COURT’S
DECISION IN RAPANOS V. UNITED STATES & CARABELL V. UNITED STATES, at 1 (Dec.
2, 2008).
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The agencies will assert jurisdiction over the following
waters:
Traditional navigable waters
Wetlands adjacent to traditional navigable waters
Non-navigable tributaries of traditional navigable waters
that are relatively permanent where the tributaries typically flow
year-round or have continuous flow at least seasonally (e.g.,
typically three months)
Wetlands that directly abut such tributaries
The agencies will decide jurisdiction over the following
waters based on a fact-specific analysis to determine whether
they have a significant nexus with a traditional navigable water:
Non-navigable tributaries that are not relatively
permanent
Wetlands adjacent to non-navigable tributaries that are
not relatively permanent
Wetlands adjacent to but that do not directly abut a
relatively permanent non-navigable tributary
The agencies generally will not assert jurisdiction over the
following features:
Swales or erosional features (e.g., gullies, small washes
characterized by low volume, infrequent, or short duration flow_
Ditches (including roadside ditches) excavated whole in
and draining only uplands and that do not carry a relatively
permanent flow of water
The agencies will apply the significant nexus standard as
follows:
A significant nexus analysis will assess the flow
characteristics and functions of the tributary itself and the
functions performed by all wetlands adjacent to the tributary to
determine if they significantly affect the chemical, physical and
biological integrity of downstream traditional navigable waters
Significant nexus includes consideration of hydrologic and
ecologic factors.43
It is important to keep in mind that in formulating its own wetlands
regulatory program, the State of California need not engage in these
intellectual acrobatics. This is because, of course, state environmental
structures for clean water are not tied to concepts of navigability.

43. CLEAN WATER ACT JURISDICTION FOLLOWING THE U.S. SUPREME COURT’S
DECISION IN RAPANOS V. UNITED STATES & CARABELL V. UNITED STATES, supra note
42, at 1.
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Not surprisingly, the Obama administration engaged in its own postRapanos rulemaking to define the scope of federal jurisdiction along the lines
expressed by Justice Kennedy. The resulting rule, commonly known as the
“WOTUS Rule,” was adopted in June 2015.44 The WOTUS Rule was promptly
litigated by a number of states (one of which was, as noted above,
represented by Scott Pruitt), farming interests, environmental groups and
others, and has been stayed pending the resolution of the litigation.
Given the Trump administration’s proposal to “repeal and replace”
Obama’s WOTUS Rule, it is unlikely ever to have the force of law. The rule is
nonetheless important because it stretched Kennedy’s “significant nexus”
theory almost beyond recognition, generating the political kick-back that led
to its pending demise. In fact, the standards contained in the WOTUS Rule
might better be characterized as based upon a theoretical rather than a
significant nexus theory. It is hard to imagine a wetland or other water—other
than those specifically exempted—that would not be subject to jurisdiction.
It is not a stretch to say the Obama administration had essentially brought
us back, however briefly, to the days of the Migratory Bird Rule.

Trump and the California Response
As they say, elections matter. If Administrator Pruitt follows through
with the directives in Trump’s Executive Order as proposed in the Federal
Register, the Corps and EPA will fall back to the line drawn by Justice Scalia.
Essentially, there will be no real federal protection of the vernal pools and
seasonal wetlands that dominate much of California’s Central Valley and
Sierra foothills.
Trump’s proposal deflated the most persuasive available arguments
against the Dredge and Fill Procedures (i.e., that a state program would
largely be duplicative and conflicting). The Water Board is now moving
quickly, having published an updated version of the Dredge and Fill
Procedures in July and public workshops to take public testimony.45 Public
comments were due in September, and as of the date this article was written
the Water Board staff is preparing responses to public comments with hopes
to bring the proposal back for final adoption early next Spring, subject to
whatever final actions are needed from the Office of Administrative Law.46
The Dredge and Fill Procedures originally were intended simply to fill
the SWANCC gap. Their purpose is now to fill the much more considerable
pending Trump gap. At this point, the regulated community is focused

44. Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States”, 80
Fed. Reg. 37054 (June 29, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R pts. 110, 112, 116,
et al.)
45. 2017 Dredge and Fill Procedures Final Draft, supra note 32.
46. See STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD, supra note 7.
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heavily on preventing the Water Board from doing something more
ambitious than simply maintaining the regulatory status quo. It is not clear
they will succeed.
Structurally, the Dredge and Fill Procedures would establish a permit
process to be exercised by the Regional Water Boards in the context of the
Section 401 certification process or, for those wetlands and waters of the
State that are no longer subject to Federal jurisdiction, Porter-Cologne. To
address concerns about conflicts with the standards and procedures
implemented by the Corps under the Clean Water Act, the Procedures
incorporate, with conforming modifications, both the Corps’s 2008
mitigation rule47 and EPA’s so-called “404(b)(1) Guidelines.48 They also
require the Regional Water Boards, to a limited extent, to defer to and rely
upon delineations, alternatives analyses, and certain other documents
prepared for the Corps for any WOTUS to be affected by a proposed project.
There are a number of important issues that remain to be resolved. A
few notable examples include:
Definition of Wetlands. Under the Clean Water Act, a wetland is a
wetland only if it satisfies three established parameters: wetland hydrology,
hydric soils, and the presence of certain concentrations of wetland plants.49
The Procedures would abandon the traditional three parameter test and
designate an area as a wetland even if it exhibits no wetland vegetation.50 Under
this new test, an ordinary un-vegetated mudflat would be treated as if it
were a vernal pool.51 In some ways this makes little difference because,
regardless of whether they are defined as wetlands, two-parameter features
will be treated as waters of the State. The potential for confusion and
conflicts due to different wetland definitions at the State and Federal levels
is extraordinarily high. One obvious way of addressing the problem would
be to retain the 3-parameter definition but designate 2-parameter features
as “special aquatic sites.” This would give them the same regulatory
protections as 3-parameter wetlands but without the need for conflicting
definitions.
404(b)(1) Alternatives Analyses. Under the 404(b)(1) Guidelines, a
discharge of dredged or fill material may not be permitted if there is a
practicable alternative to the proposed project that would be less

47. 33 C.F.R. Part 330.
48. 40 C.F.R. § 230 et seq.
49. 40 C.F.R. § 232.2 (2011); see also U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, SECTION 404 OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT: HOW WETLANDS ARE DEFINED AND
IDENTIFIED, https://perma.cc/AH67-9A2Z.
50. 2017 Dredge and Fill Procedures Final Draft, supra note 32 at 1–2.
51. Id.
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environmentally damaging to the aquatic environment. That is, a proposed
project must be the “LEDPA” (the “least environmentally damaging
practicable alternative”). Because the burden of proof typically is on the
applicant to show clearly that his or her project is the LEDPA, for large
projects this requirement requires lengthy and extraordinarily complex
reports that often take years to prepare. For small projects, however, the
Corps typically requires far less rigor in these analyses, and often does not
require them at all for fills proposed under the Nationwide Permit program.
Under the Procedures, the Regional Water Boards would require the
preparation of full and rigorous “LEDPA analyses” for any fill of a water of
the State that exceeds 0.2 acres, which ordinarily would not be required for
the fill of a Federal WOTUS.52 This eliminates the important timing benefits
of the Nationwide Permit program, which is heavily relied upon by public
agencies like CalTrans and the High Speed Rail Authority. It will be
important for the Water Board to find some way of resolving this conflict.
Deference to Corps Delineations and Other Regulatory Documents.
Although the Dredge and Fill Procedures require the Regional Water Boards
to defer to delineations, LEDPA analyses and other documents prepared at
the federal level as noted above, the Procedures provide broad latitude for
the Water Boards to disagree with the federal documents and require
preparation of different documents for their own purposes. That is, the
streamlining intended to be built into the deference requirements is not
particularly enforceable, and may lead to duplicative and technical studies
for projects affecting both WOTUS and non-WOTUS waters of the State.
Treatment of Prior Converted Croplands (PCC) and Agricultural
Exemptions. Under federal law, wetlands that were converted to agricultural
use prior to 1985 are not treated as WOTUS unless their agricultural use is
abandoned for five years and wetland conditions return. The Dredge and Fill
Procedures include a trigger for abandonment that is more sensitive than
the federal standard, and this may lead to unanticipated assertions of
jurisdiction over active farmland.53 The agricultural community has also
expressed concern that the Dredge and Fill Policies would allow the
imposition of restrictions on “normal farming activities,” which are currently
exempt from regulation under Section 404(f) of the Clean Water Act.54
Exclusions. The Procedures do contain some helpful exclusions from
coverage, particularly for artificial features. There are some mechanical
problems with the way these are drafted, which we expect will be worked out
in the final draft. One problem, however, is that the list of exclusions does
not include a number of exclusions that have been used by the Corps over
the years and which are identified in the preamble to the Corps’s 1986

52. 2017 Dredge and Fill Procedures Final Draft, supra note 32, at 6.
53. Id. at 12.
54. 2017 Dredge and Fill Procedures Final Draft, supra note 32, at 11.
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regulations. These exclusions (e.g., ditches, construction-related features)
were upgraded to the level of regulation in the 2008 WOTUS Rule, but do not
appear to have made it into the Procedures, at least as of the date of
submission of this article. The other very problem is that the exclusions
have little practical effect. That is, they do not exclude the features from the
procedures, but only from the presumption (applicable to wetlands) that
there are practicable alternatives to filling the feature in question.
Mitigation Requirements. Although the Draft Procedures incorporate
the Corps’s 2008 mitigation rule, the text of the Procedures appears to
include requirements that are not currently found at the federal level,55
particularly with respect to considerations of watershed-based mitigation
planning. This does not appear, however, to be a high priority item for
resolution among those industry groups expressing concern about the
Procedures.
In summary, the State Water Board is proposing a robust regulatory
program with standards that are higher than those found in current Federal
regulation and a geographic scope that is broader than even President
Obama’s proposal. If President Trump’s “replace” of the Obama rule is
unsuccessful and the current Corps regulations remain in effect, there will
be many practical challenges to making the State and Federal programs
work together. It will be a learning experience to say the least, and the
Water Boards will need adequate staffing and training to manage this
program. If the Trump administration succeeds, however, the potential for
conflicts will be limited to only those waters that are navigable as defined by
Justice Scalia. Either way, the State of California will step into leadership on
these issues, and we will have a new and more effective set of protections
for all of California’s wetlands, regardless of whether they “are or could be
used by migratory birds.”

55. Id. at 9–10.
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